Elections présidentielles américaines : comment sortir du dilemme du prisonnier ?
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- Héloïse Cloléry & Yukio Koriyama, 2020. "Elections présidentielles américaines : comment sortir du dilemme du prisonnier ?," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-03019443, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2008. "A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 231-246, March.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019.
"The Winner-Take-All Dilemma,"
ISER Discussion Paper
1059r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2019.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2022. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," Papers 2206.09574, arXiv.org.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," ISER Discussion Paper 1059, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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