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The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions

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  • Schlegel, Jan Christoph

    (Department of Economics, City, University of London)

Abstract

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2022. "The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4405
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    1. Tam'as Fleiner & Zsuzsanna Jank'o & Akihisa Tamura & Alexander Teytelboym, 2015. "Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts," Papers 1510.01210, arXiv.org, revised May 2018.
    2. John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 176-208, February.
    3. Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018. "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 287-294.
    4. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-440, June.
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    6. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    7. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke & Nichifor, Alexandru & Ostrovsky, Michael & Westkamp, Alexander, 2019. "Full substitutability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    8. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima & Scott Duke Kominers, 2014. "Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 436-441, May.
    9. Tamás Fleiner & Ravi Jagadeesan & Zsuzsanna Jankó & Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Trading Networks With Frictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1633-1661, September.
    10. Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer, 2019. "Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(3), pages 867-932, May.
    11. John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexandru Nichifor & Michael Ostrovsky & Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 966-1005.
    12. Kominers, Scott Duke & Hatfield, John William & Nichifor, Alexandru & Ostrovsky, Michael & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Chain stability in trading networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(1), January.
    13. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2016. "Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.11, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu, 2021. "Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    2. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2023. "Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 210-228.
    3. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    4. P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Yu Zhou, 2022. "Competitive Equilibria In Matching Models With Financial Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 777-802, May.
    5. Elizabeth Baldwin & Omer Edhan & Ravi Jagadeesan & Paul Klemperer & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020. "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Papers 2006.16939, arXiv.org.
    6. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021. "Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples," ISER Discussion Paper 1116, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trading Networks; Full Substitutability; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Competitive Equilibrium; Indivisible Goods; Frictions; Lattice; Rural Hospitals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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