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Costly miscalibration

Author

Listed:
  • Guo, Yingni

    (Department of Economics, Northwestern University)

  • Shmaya, Eran

    (Department of Economics, Stony Brook University)

Abstract

We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for miscalibration, and show how this equilibrium depends on the miscalibration cost: when the miscalibration cost is low, the platform uses more distant forecasts and the customer is less responsive to the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a microfoundation for the commitment solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Yingni & Shmaya, Eran, 2021. "Costly miscalibration," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3991
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org.
    2. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    3. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
    4. Alexander V. Kolesnikov & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Aleh Tsyvinski & Alexander P. Zimin, 2022. "Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions," Papers 2203.06837, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    5. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    6. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
    7. Daehong Min, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 743-764, October.
    8. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    9. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Calibration; miscalibration; cheap talk; commitment; Bayesian persuasion; e-commerce platform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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