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Revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains: a comprehensive literature review

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  • Nelly Bart
  • Tatyana Chernonog
  • Tal Avinadav

Abstract

Revenue sharing contracts (RSCs) have gained considerable popularity over the past two decades—particularly among prominent platform distributors such as the Apple App Store, Google Play, and Amazon— and have therefore attracted a great deal of research attention in the domain of supply-chain management. This study is the first to review the literature dealing with RSCs, a literature in which the number of articles has been growing consistently over the years. Specifically, we aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the state of the art of the research field, and to identify potentially fruitful areas for further exploration. To this end, we have carried out a content analysis of 148 carefully selected papers that address various aspects of RSCs in the domains of operations research and operations management. Our survey classifies and discusses the reviewed papers along numerous dimensions of interest, including the types of contract they incorporate and the research questions they address. We provide mathematical formulations of the two RSC structures that are most prevalent in research and in practice: (i) a wholesale-price contract that incorporates an added revenue-sharing mechanism; and (ii) a consignment contract with revenue sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Nelly Bart & Tatyana Chernonog & Tal Avinadav, 2021. "Revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains: a comprehensive literature review," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(21), pages 6633-6658, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tprsxx:v:59:y:2021:i:21:p:6633-6658
    DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2020.1821929
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    Cited by:

    1. Sharifi, Rozhin & Razavi, Hamideh & Elahi, Ehsan, 2023. "Investigation of the ordering behavior of a retailer in the revenue sharing and buyback contracts considering round number bias," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    2. Jia, Fu & Zhang, Shiyuan & Zheng, Xiao-Xue & Choi, Tsan-Ming, 2023. "A novel coordination mechanism to coordinate the multi-agent reverse supply chain with fairness concerns," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 265(C).
    3. Avinadav, Tal & Levy, Priel, 2023. "The effect of an uncertain commission rate on the decisions of a capital-constrained developer," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 11(C).
    4. Koussis, Nicos & Silaghi, Florina, 2023. "Revenue-sharing and volume flexibility in the supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 261(C).
    5. Avinadav, Tal & Levy, Priel, 2024. "Improving efficiency in supply chains with a capital-constrained app developer under the agency contract," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 315(3), pages 991-1005.
    6. Ghavamifar, Ali & Torabi, S. Ali & Moshtari, Mohammad, 2022. "A hybrid relief procurement contract for humanitarian logistics," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    7. Jin, Jie & He, Junliang & Wang, Xudong & Han, Chuanfeng & Meng, Lingpeng, 2024. "Contract design in ocean shipping market: A performance credit leveraged mechanism," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 272(C).
    8. Huang, Weixiang & Sang, Qingyuan & Zhou, Wenhui & Zhu, Han, 2024. "Challenge or opportunity? Impact of a two-invoice mechanism on pharmaceutical supply chains with channel promotion," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 270(C).
    9. Zheng, Xiao-Xue & Li, Deng-Feng, 2023. "A new biform game-based investment incentive mechanism for eco-efficient innovation in supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 258(C).
    10. Ali Sabbaghnia & Jafar Heydari & Jafar Razmi, 2023. "Participative pricing and donation programs in a socially concerned supply chain," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(1), pages 146-164, January.

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