Author
Listed:
- Yingying Xu
- Jinshi Wang
- Ao Cheng
- Lijing Wang
Abstract
In a low‐carbon service supply chain, consisting of a carbon‐dependent manufacturer and a low‐carbon service company, a dual contract for revenue sharing and guaranteed carbon reduction promotes sustainable collaboration and emission reduction. However, adjusting contract terms and collaborative relationships when negative cooperative behavior occurs or a collaboration impasse arises remains underexplored. Thus, we constructed an evolutionary game model to analyze cooperative behaviors between carbon‐dependent manufacturers and low‐carbon service companies. Through stability analysis, we identify conditions for active commitment. Importantly, potential negative strategies may hinder optimal cooperative emission reduction, leading to a cooperative deadlock. Numerical simulations reveal the following: (1) Higher guaranteed carbon reduction targets or moderate liquidated deposit can prevent negative behaviors. (2) Changing the allocation ratio of carbon trading revenue or government subsidies helps the chain move towards cooperation. (3) Service innovation facilitates positive cooperation; however, low‐carbon service companies must possess the capability to translate their level of service innovation into carbon reduction performance. Furthermore, the mechanisms through which utilitarian and exploratory service innovations influence cooperative decision‐making differ. (4) When supply chain members find themselves in a decision‐making impasse, in addition to moderately increasing the carbon reduction guarantee amount or the penalties for failing to meet carbon reduction targets, enhancing the distribution ratio of carbon trading revenues for carbon‐dependent manufacturers, increasing the allocation of government subsidies, and implementing service innovations can also help break the deadlock. (5) Combined carbon trading policies and government subsidies effectively promote sustainability compared to singular adoption. These findings impact cooperative emission reduction in low‐carbon service supply chains and policy formulation. The conclusions of this paper have implications for the maintenance of cooperative emission reduction relationships among members in the operation of low‐carbon service supply chains and the formulation of policies.
Suggested Citation
Yingying Xu & Jinshi Wang & Ao Cheng & Lijing Wang, 2025.
"How to Achieve Cooperative Emission Reduction in Low‐Carbon Service Supply Chains: An Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Study,"
Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(3), pages 1602-1627, April.
Handle:
RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:3:p:1602-1627
DOI: 10.1002/mde.4453
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