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The separation of information and lending and the rise of rating agencies in the USA (1841-1907)

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  • Marc Flandreau
  • Gabriel Geisler Mesevage

Abstract

This paper provides a new interpretation of the early rise of rating agencies in the USA (initially known as 'mercantile agencies'). We explain this American exceptionality through an inductive approach that revisits the conventional parallel with the UK. In contrast with earlier narratives that have emphasised the role of Common Law and the greater understanding of American judges that would have supported the rise of an ethos of 'transparency', we argue that Mercantile Agencies prospered as a remedy to deficient bankruptcy law and weak protection of creditor rights in the USA. The result was to raise the value of the nationwide registry of defaulters which the mercantile agencies managed. This ensured the Agencies' profitability and endowed them with resources to buy their survival in a legal environment that remained stubbornly hostile.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Flandreau & Gabriel Geisler Mesevage, 2014. "The separation of information and lending and the rise of rating agencies in the USA (1841-1907)," Scandinavian Economic History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(3), pages 213-242, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:sehrxx:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:213-242
    DOI: 10.1080/03585522.2014.950602
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    1. Galassi, Francesco L. & Newton, Lucy A., 2001. "My Word Is My Bond: Reputation As Collateral In Nineteenth Century English Provincial Banking," Economic Research Papers 269369, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
    3. Hoppit,Julian, 2002. "Risk and Failure in English Business 1700–1800," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521890878, October.
    4. Hidy, R. W., 1935. "The House of Baring and American Trade," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(05), pages 71-75, October.
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    1. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
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