IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/rrpaxx/v17y2012i1p149-177.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Shining a Light on the Dark Side of Business:The Resistible Growth of Criminal Firms in the Public Sector

Author

Listed:
  • Paolo Canonico
  • Stefano Consiglio
  • Ernesto De Nito
  • Gianluigi Mangia

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the mechanisms adopted by criminal firms in order to thrive in the business of public works. We submit that resource dependency theory (RDT) can shed light on this area. We find that criminal firms use a variety of techniques to alter the behavior of actors in procurement processes. We claim that the best way to analyze this phenomenon is by integrating the traditional RDT strategies codified in Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) with an understanding of these criminal techniques. We adopt a qualitative research methodology, relying on official judiciary sources in order to develop and validate the concept’s objects of analysis. Our work has been supported by leading Italian magistrates actively engaged in combating the penetration of criminal firms into legal businesses.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Canonico & Stefano Consiglio & Ernesto De Nito & Gianluigi Mangia, 2012. "Shining a Light on the Dark Side of Business:The Resistible Growth of Criminal Firms in the Public Sector," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 149-177, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rrpaxx:v:17:y:2012:i:1:p:149-177
    DOI: 10.1080/12264431.2012.10805221
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/12264431.2012.10805221
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/12264431.2012.10805221?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Riccardo Mercurio & Paolo Canonico & Mario Pezzillo Iacono, 2012. "Organizing mobility as an infrastructure for development," Chapters, in: Peter Karl Kresl & Daniele Ietri (ed.), European Cities and Global Competitiveness, chapter 14, pages 259-273, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Mr. Vito Tanzi & Mr. Hamid R Davoodi, 1997. "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth," IMF Working Papers 1997/139, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Di Giorno, Saverio & Dileo, Ivano & Busato, Francesco, 2024. "Shades of grand corruption among allocative efficiency and institutional settings. The case of Italy," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Ravenda, Diego & Giuranno, Michele G. & Valencia-Silva, Maika M. & Argiles-Bosch, Josep M. & García-Blandón, Josep, 2020. "The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Ahmet Faruk AYSAN & Mustapha Kamel NABLI & Marie‐Ange VÉGANZONÈS‐VAROUDAKIS, 2007. "Governance Institutions And Private Investment: An Application To The Middle East And North Africa," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 45(3), pages 339-377, September.
    3. Yaron Zelekha & Léo-Paul Dana, 2019. "Social Capital Versus Cultural Capital Determinants of Entrepreneurship: An Empirical Study of the African Continent," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Emerging Economies, Entrepreneurship Development Institute of India, vol. 28(2), pages 250-269, September.
    4. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    5. Chandan Sharma, 2021. "Does Corruption Sand The Wheels Of Financial Sector Development? Evidence From Global Panel Data," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions (JFMMI), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 1-32, December.
    6. Alberto Bagnai & Christian Alexander Mongeau Ospina, 2018. "Monetary integration vs. real disintegration: single currency and productivity divergence in the euro area," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 353-367, October.
    7. Shrabani Saha & Kunal Sen, 2019. "The corruption-growth relationship: Do political institutions matter?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-65, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Ghulam Shabbir & Mumtaz Anwar & Shahid Adil, 2016. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 689-702.
    9. Joan Rosselló Villalonga, 2018. "Fiscal centralization: a remedy for corruption?," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 457-474, November.
    10. Gueorguiev, Dimitar & Malesky, Edmund, 2012. "Foreign investment and bribery: A firm-level analysis of corruption in Vietnam," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 111-129.
    11. Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, 2011. "Public Investment and Fiscal Performance in the New EU Member States," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 32(1), pages 43-71, March.
    12. Harouna Sedgo & Luc Désiré Omgba, 2023. "Corruption and distortion of public expenditures: evidence from Africa," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(2), pages 419-452, April.
    13. Kshitiz Shrestha & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez & Charles Hankla, 2023. "Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 411-439, March.
    14. Musaev, Rasul (Мусаев, Расул) & Malakhov, Anton (Малахов, Антон), 2014. ""Budget Law" in Russia: experience and prospects [«Бюджетное Правило» В России: Опыт И Перспективы]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 161-170, December.
    15. Ndiaye Cheikh Tidiane, 2019. "Corruption, Investment and Economic Growth in WAEMU Countries," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(4), pages 30-39, April.
    16. Yan Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2012. "How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide," NBER Working Papers 17981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Luca Correani, 2005. "Preferences, Development and Corruption Trap," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 177-200.
    18. Riccardo Crescenzi & Marco Di Cataldo & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2016. "Government Quality And The Economic Returns Of Transport Infrastructure Investment In European Regions," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 555-582, September.
    19. Joshua Aizenman & Ilan Noy, 2007. "Prizes for basic research: Human capital, economic might and the shadow of history," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 261-282, September.
    20. Simplice A Asongu, 2015. "A Good Turn Deserves Another: Political Stability, Corruption and Corruption-Control," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2037-2048.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:rrpaxx:v:17:y:2012:i:1:p:149-177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RRPA20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.