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Does a firm's political connection to government have economic value?

Author

Listed:
  • C.M. Chen
  • M. Ariff
  • T. Hassan
  • S. Mohamad

Abstract

This paper reports new findings about differential impacts political events have on share prices of firms connected to government in power compared to firms with no political connections. Political connection has been alleged as valuable in popular press in this mid-income economy studied, so it is worth an investigation. Significant share price increases of 4% or more abnormal returns accrue to connected firms relative to unconnected firms when identical political events occur. The impact is very pronounced during a severe economic crisis, when the stakes were high about an incumbent government being reelected. Our finding of higher value of politically connected firms is due to the expected value of preferential treatments, preference in project selections, and access to state benefits. Thus, share prices of politically connected firms react with greater impacts than nonpolitically connected firms to announcements of identical political events.

Suggested Citation

  • C.M. Chen & M. Ariff & T. Hassan & S. Mohamad, 2014. "Does a firm's political connection to government have economic value?," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rjapxx:v:19:y:2014:i:1:p:1-24
    DOI: 10.1080/13547860.2013.860761
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Ferguson & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 101-137.
    2. Mohamed Ariff & Ahmed M. Khalid, 2005. "Liberalization and Growth in Asia," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2909.
    3. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2000. "Corporate Performance in the East Asian Financial Crisis," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 15(1), pages 23-46, February.
    4. Paola Bongini & Stijn Claessens & Giovanni Ferri, 2001. "The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 5-25, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Qian, Wei & Chen, Xuan, 2021. "Corporate environmental disclosure and political connection in regulatory and leadership changes: The case of China," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1).
    2. Wong, Wai-Yan & Hooy, Chee-Wooi, 2018. "Do types of political connection affect firm performance differently?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 297-317.
    3. Ahmad, Abd Halim, 2019. "What factors discriminate reorganized and delisted distressed firms: Evidence from Malaysia," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 50-56.

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