IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/revpoe/v14y2002i2p193-209.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Contested Sovereignty of the Firm

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Dietrich

Abstract

This paper suggests that the firm can be analysed as a regulated system of contested sovereignty. The economic literature on the firm is categorised in terms of four different perspectives on sovereignty identified using the twin factors of power and authority. But rather than any single perspective being identified as analytically superior, it is argued that a system of contested sovereignty should be based on all four perspectives. Following this, a Polanyi-inspired analysis of firm regulation is presented in which the regulation of the firm emerges to control the costs of free markets. However, this regulation depicts firm sovereignty as complex and contested rather than simply an optimal response to market failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Dietrich, 2002. "The Contested Sovereignty of the Firm," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 193-209.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:193-209
    DOI: 10.1080/09538250220126519
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09538250220126519
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09538250220126519?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Multicontract Organization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 459-466, August.
    4. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    5. Felix R. Fitzroy & Kornelius Kraft*, 1985. "Unionization, Wages and Efficiency," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 537-554, November.
    6. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    7. Earl, Peter E, 1990. "Economics and Psychology: A Survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(402), pages 718-755, September.
    8. repec:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:216:p:493-504 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Dow, Gregory K., 1987. "The function of authority in transaction cost economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 13-38, March.
    10. Michael Dietrich, 1993. "Total Quality Control, Just-in-Time Management, and the Economics of the Firm," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 20(6), pages 17-31, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Teodor Sedlarski, 2014. "Socio-psychological aspects of market exchange in institutional economy," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 95-114.
    2. Dirk Nicolas Wagner, 2019. "The Opportunistic Principal," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(4), pages 637-657, November.
    3. Chavas, Jean-Paul, 2008. "On the economics of agricultural production," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(4), pages 1-16.
    4. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, September.
    5. José Castro Caldas & Helder Coelho, 1999. "The Origin of Institutions: Socio-Economic Processes, Choice, Norms and Conventions," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 2(2), pages 1-1.
    6. Derek Jones & Panu Kalmi & Niels Mygind, 2005. "Choice of Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Estonia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 83-107.
    7. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    8. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:483-506 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Yang, Bijou & Lester, David, 1995. "New directions for economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 433-446.
    10. Alley Ibrahim S. & Adebayo Abimbola L. & Oligbi Blessing O., 2016. "Corporate Governance and Financial Performance Nexus: Any Bidirectional Causality?," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 50(1), pages 82-99, June.
    11. Thomas Vendryes, 2014. "Peasants Against Private Property Rights: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 971-995, December.
    12. Zoran Stefanovic, Branislav Mitrovic, 2015. "Revisiting New Institutional Economics: Basic Concepts And Research Directions," Ekonomika, Journal for Economic Theory and Practice and Social Issues 2014-04, „Ekonomika“ Society of Economists, Niš (Serbia).
    13. Elissa Braunstein & Nancy Folbre, 2001. "To Honor and Obey: Efficiency, Inequality, and Patriarchal Property Rights," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 25-44.
    14. Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, 2011. "Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(10), pages 3401-3433.
    15. Iavor Marangozov, 2005. "From Practice to Theory of the International Joint Ventures," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 2, pages 44-77.
    16. Rodrigo Martins & Fernando Ribeiro Serra & André da Silva Leite & Manuel Portugal Ferreira & Dan Li, 2010. "Transactions Cost Theory influence in strategy research: A review through a bibliometric study in leading journals," Working Papers 61, globADVANTAGE, Polytechnic Institute of Leiria.
    17. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, March.
    18. Marianne Fischman & Emeric Lendjel, 2011. "Market efficiency and French « contrats types » : a transaction cost analysis of the voyage charter for freight inland waterway transport [Efficience du marché et « contrats types » : une analyse t," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-04008565, HAL.
    19. Matyukha, Andriy, 2017. "Business groups in agriculture impact of ownership structures on performance: The case of Russia's agroholdings," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies 254051, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    20. Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2015. "Trust and trustworthiness in experimental organizations," CEEL Working Papers 1501, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    21. Per-Olof Bjuggren & Johan Eklund, 2015. "Property rights and the cost of capital," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 523-537, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:193-209. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRPE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.