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Challenges for Public Service Capacity and the Role of Public Employee Training as a Moderator in India

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  • Vyas
  • Jung
  • Shafiqul Huque

Abstract

This article examines the efforts made in India for the capacity building of public service. It addresses the negative influences, which the existing majority-minority divide, quota system, and the issue of corruption have on capacity building in the public sector and examines the moderating role played by public service training arrangements in capacity building. Mixed method is used and data are taken from survey and interviews with public officials. Findings show that efforts to accommodate the minority in the public services, quota system, and corruption harm the capacity-building initiative of the Indian central government. However, training can assist capacity building by serving as a moderator for accommodating diverse groups between competing needs in the pluralistic Indian society. Hence, improvement of training quality and effectiveness are expected to ensure that public servants are aware of the rules and that their applications possess the ability to tender relevant advice and assistance to the political executive. Furthermore, the findings may be used to draw insights about bureaucracy in other developing countries, although this study is based on efforts to build capacity in India.

Suggested Citation

  • Vyas & Jung & Shafiqul Huque, 2013. "Challenges for Public Service Capacity and the Role of Public Employee Training as a Moderator in India," Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(8), pages 1116-1136, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:pubmgr:v:15:y:2013:i:8:p:1116-1136
    DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.816521
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. HUBER, JOHN D. & McCARTY, NOLAN, 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 481-494, August.
    2. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226316529 is not listed on IDEAS
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