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One More Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Trade Law: Are There Cumulative Effects over Time?
[К Оценке Регулирующего Воздействия Закона О Торговле: Накапливаются Ли Эффекты?]

Author

Listed:
  • Radaev, Vadim (Радаев, Вадим)

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

Continuous attempts to strengthen the trade law aimed at restoring the “balance of market power” in retailer-supplier relationships led to the adoption of new amendments to this law in 2016. New series of inspections have been initiated by the Federal Antimonopoly Service since the beginning of 2017. For regulatory impact assessment, empirical data were collected from three standardized surveys of retail chain managers and suppliers in five Russia’s cities with developed retailing (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, and Tyumen) in 2010, 2013 and 2016. Similar methods of data collection were used. Overall, data were collected from 2,039 managers in the grocery and nonfood sectors with equal representation of retailers and suppliers. Regarding the main findings, the author argues that the expected improvement of contractual relations and vertical restraints had not been achieved in the grocery sector by the end of 2016. Contractual terms and conditions did not become easier for the suppliers. Contrary to expectations, there are no significant differences between grocery and non-food sectors. However, cumulative effects of the law enactment have led to a progressive differentiation of estimates. Retailers’ estimates remained more stable, whereas suppliers’ estimates became more pessimistic, which is particularly true for large suppliers. A new precedent model of governance using the liberal rhetoric of competition protection was implemented to justify state intervention in interfirm contractual relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Radaev, Vadim (Радаев, Вадим), 2018. "One More Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Trade Law: Are There Cumulative Effects over Time? [К Оценке Регулирующего Воздействия Закона О Торговле: Накапливаются Ли Эффекты?]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 28-61, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1821
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    retailing; contractual practices; trade law; regulatory impact assessment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P23 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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