Ex ante liability rules in New Zealand's health and safety in employment act: A law and economics analysis
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DOI: 10.1080/00779950709558500
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- Paul Gordon & Alan E. Woodfield, 2006. "Ex Ante Liability Rules in New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act: A Law and Economics Analysis," Working Papers in Economics 06/02, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
References listed on IDEAS
- Paul Gordon & Alan E. Woodfield, 2006. "Incentives and the Changing Structure of Penalties in New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act," Working Papers in Economics 06/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
- Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
- Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer.
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Cited by:
- Paul Gordon & Alan E. Woodfield, 2006. "Incentives and the Changing Structure of Penalties in New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act," Working Papers in Economics 06/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Andrea Menclova & Alan Woodfield, 2013. "The Composition of Health and Safety in Employment Sentences in New Zealand: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers in Economics 13/13, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
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More about this item
Keywords
Safety precautions; ex ante liability;JEL classification:
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
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