IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/jmedec/v20y2007i1p55-75.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Profit Sharing in a Closed Content Market

Author

Listed:
  • Jungsuk Oh

Abstract

Many media industries can be characterized as a closed content market in which only subscribers of the distribution network operator (Network Provider [NP]) have access to the content provided by a content provider (CP). In these markets, the NP frequently charges the CP for providing billing and connectivity services to potential customers. Due to this carriage payment, the closed content market has structural similarity to the coalitional form game. Consequently, concepts of superadditivity, the core, and the Shapley value can be applied to determine what constitutes a sustainable and fair share of the CP's profit that could be paid to the NP as a carriage payment. This article addresses issues concerning the existence of the sustainable and fair profit allocation in a closed content market like the one described previously.

Suggested Citation

  • Jungsuk Oh, 2007. "Profit Sharing in a Closed Content Market," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 55-75.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:20:y:2007:i:1:p:55-75
    DOI: 10.1080/08997760709337019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08997760709337019
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/08997760709337019?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-123, March.
    4. MacKie-Mason, J & Shenker, S & Varian, HR, 1996. "Service architecture and content provision. The network provider as editor," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 203-217, April.
    5. Chae, Suchan & Flores, Daniel, 1998. "Broadcasting versus narrowcasting," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-57, March.
    6. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring.
    7. Church, Jeffrey & Gandal, Neil, 1992. "Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 85-103, March.
    8. Ken-ichi Inada, 1964. "Some Structural Characteristics of Turnpike Theorems," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 31(1), pages 43-58.
    9. Koh Byungwan & Oh Jungsuk, 2006. "Determination of Revenue Streams Subject to Sharing in the Mobile Internet Market," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(3), pages 1-14, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Monica Johar & Nanda Kumar & Vijay Mookerjee, 2012. "Content Provision Strategies in the Presence of Content Piracy," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(3-part-2), pages 960-975, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003. "Compatibility and pricing with indirect network effects: evidence from ATMs," Working Paper Series WP-03-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    2. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003. "Compatibility and pricing with indirect network effects: evidence from ATMs," Working Paper Series WP-03-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    3. Nicholas Economides, 1997. "The Economics of Networks," Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, vol. 1(0), December.
    4. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1993. "One-Way Networks, Two-Way Networks, Compatibility, and Antitrust," Working Papers 93-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Oz Shy, 2011. "A Short Survey of Network Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(2), pages 119-149, March.
    6. Desruelle, Dominique & Gaudet, Gerard & Richelle, Yves, 1996. "Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 747-768, October.
    7. Laura Baraldi, 2004. "Esternalita' Di Rete: Una Rassegna," Working Papers 12_2004, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
    8. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2009. "How Does Incompatibility Affect Prices?: Evidence From Atm'S," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 557-582, September.
    9. Frederick R. Warren-Boulton & Kenneth C. Baseman & Glenn A. Woroch, 1994. "The Economics of Intellectual Property Protection for Software: The Proper Role for Copyright," Industrial Organization 9411004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Yang, Yi-Nung & Barrett, Christopher B., 1997. "Nonconcave, Nonmonotonic Network Externalities," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers 28350, Utah State University, Economics Department.
    11. Gual, Jordi, 2003. "Market Definition in the Telecoms Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 3988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 429-472, December.
    13. Zhao, Yuntong & Du, Yushen, 2021. "Technical standard competition: An ecosystem-view analysis based on stochastic evolutionary game theory," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    14. Kari Kemppainen, 2004. "Competition and regulation in European retail payment systems," Microeconomics 0404008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Knittel Christopher R. & Stango Victor, 2008. "Incompatibility, Product Attributes and Consumer Welfare: Evidence from ATMs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-42, January.
    16. Christiaan Hogendorn & Stephen Ka Yat Yuen, 2009. "Platform Competition With ‘Must‐Have’ Components," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 294-318, June.
    17. den Hartigh, E. & Langerak, F. & Commandeur, H.R., 2002. "The Effects of Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms on Firm Performance," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2002-46-MKT, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    18. Kemppainen, Kari, 2003. "Competition and regulation in European retail payment systems," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2003, Bank of Finland.
    19. Matutes, Carmen & Regibeau, Pierre, 1996. "A selective review of the economics of standardization. Entry deterrence, technological progress and international competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 183-209, September.
    20. John M. Crespi & Jennifer S. James, 2007. "Bargaining rationale for cooperative generic advertising," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 51(4), pages 445-457, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:20:y:2007:i:1:p:55-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/HMEC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.