IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/jecmet/v9y2001i1p11-30.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Filling in the Background

Author

Listed:
  • Jochen Runde

Abstract

Commonsense rational choice explanations exploit a form of intentional causation, an idealized version of which underpins the formal rational modelling of modern economic theory. Following John Searle, it is argued that the deliberations and activities of economic actors do not bottom out in intentional states, but in various nonintentional or 'Background' capacities and dispositions. It is shown why the formal version of rational choice theory employed in economics does not have the resources to address such capacities and dispositions, and that the prevailing commitment to this theory thereby reinforces their neglect. Examples are given of the impact of Background phenomena in the economic realm.

Suggested Citation

  • Jochen Runde, 2001. "Filling in the Background," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 11-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:9:y:2001:i:1:p:11-30
    DOI: 10.1080/13501780110120082
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501780110120082
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13501780110120082?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carroll, Glenn R. & Teece, David J. (ed.), 1999. "Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Perspective," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195119510.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
    2. Lars Kumkar, 2003. "Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 91-115.
    3. Lukasz Hardt, 2011. "An inquiry into the explanatory virtues of transaction cost economics," The Journal of Philosophical Economics, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 120-147, November.
    4. Kashani, Hossein A., 2005. "Regulation and efficiency: an empirical analysis of the United Kingdom continental shelf petroleum industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 915-925, May.
    5. Christian Balcells, 2022. "Determinants of firm boundaries and organizational performance: an empirical investigation of the Chilean truck market," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 423-461, April.
    6. Peter Ross & Greg J. Bamber, 2009. "Strategic Choices in Pluralist and Unitarist Employment Relations Regimes: A Study of Australian Telecommunications," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(1), pages 24-41, October.
    7. Francesca Carnevali, 2004. "‘Crooks, thieves, and receivers’: transaction costs in nineteenth‐century industrial Birmingham," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 57(3), pages 533-550, August.
    8. Mike, Károly, 2015. "Kevesebb vagy több közgazdaságtant?. Valentiny Pál-Kiss Ferenc László-Nagy Csongor István (szerk.): Verseny és szabályozás, 2013. MTA KRTK KTI, Budapest, 2014, 372 o [More or less economics?. Pál V," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 335-340.
    9. Heikki Marjosola, 2021. "The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 388-407, April.
    10. Haizhi Wang & Robert Wuebker & Shu Han & Michael Ensley, 2012. "Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 179-196, February.
    11. Dean V. Williamson, 2006. "Organization, Control and the Single Entity Defense in Antitrust," EAG Discussions Papers 200604, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    12. Kyeungrae Oh, 2017. "MNEs’ Ownership Structure under Uncertainty: Explanations from TCE and Real Options Logic," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(2), pages 1-67, January.
    13. Bourdeau de Fontenay, Alain & Liebenau, Jonathan & Savin, Brian, 2005. "A New View of Scale and Scope in the Telecommunications Industry: Implications for Competition and Innovation," MPRA Paper 2516, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. John Finch & Nicola Dinnei, 2001. "Capturing Knightian Advantages of Large Business Organisations Through Group Decision-making Processes," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 379-403.
    15. Bruttel, Oliver, 2005. "Contracting-out and governance mechanisms in the public employment service," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2005-109, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    16. Morawska Sylwia & Prusak Błażej & Banasik Przemysław & Woźniak-Jęchorek Beata, 2019. "Sanctions and their role in preventing the appropriation of the creditor’s property rights in bankruptcy proceedings–the case of Poland," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 93-113, March.
    17. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    18. Teece, David J., 2010. "Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 679-730, Elsevier.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:9:y:2001:i:1:p:11-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RJEC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.