IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/jculte/v9y2016i1p5-26.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public Currency: Anthropological Labor in Central Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Douglas R. Holmes

Abstract

This article examines the operation of an emerging monetary regime in which ‘mere words’, as Yellen, Janet (2013. ‘Communications in Monetary Policy.’ Speech presented at the Society of American Business Editors and Writers 50th Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC, April 4) recently noted, play a decisive role. Drawing on my field research in five central banks -- the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bundesbank, the Bank of England, the Riksbank, and the European Central Bank -- I address how this regime, which I term a ‘public currency’, works in theory and practice and what is at stake in its regulation and management. At the heart of this regime is a far-reaching premise: the public must be broadly recruited to collaborate with central banks in achieving the ends of monetary policy, namely ‘stable prices and confidence in the currency’. I further argue that monetary policy is now being aligned overtly with public interests, interests that are not fully or necessarily reducible to the prerogatives of finance or the interests of financial markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas R. Holmes, 2016. "Public Currency: Anthropological Labor in Central Banks," Journal of Cultural Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 5-26, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jculte:v:9:y:2016:i:1:p:5-26
    DOI: 10.1080/17530350.2015.1068700
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17530350.2015.1068700
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/17530350.2015.1068700?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Claudio Borio, 2011. "Central banking post-crisis: What compass for uncharted waters?," BIS Working Papers 353, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry, 2016. "Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780190621070.
    3. Goodhart, C. A. E., 2010. "The Changing Role of Central Banks," Working Papers 11-27, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    4. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2006. "Monetary Policy and Japan's Liquidity Trap," Working Papers 76, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    5. Vasilev, Aleksandar & Maksumov, Rashid, 2010. "Critical analysis of Chapter 23 of Keynes’s Notes on Mercantilism in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936)," EconStor Research Reports 155318, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    6. Janet L. Yellen, 2013. "Communication in Monetary Policy : a speech at the Society of American Business Editors and Writers 50th Anniversary Conference, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2013," Speech 625, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maxence Follot, 2024. "The impact of populism on central bank communication: Analyzing theoretical developments and the case of Hungary," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 21(1), pages 65-95, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Central Banks And Macroprudential Policies: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1878, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Nuno Ornelas Martins, 2016. "Political aspects of the capital controversies and capitalist crises," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(4), pages 473-494, October.
    3. Emmanuel Carré & Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran & Dominique Plihon & Marc Pourroy, 2013. "Central Banking after the Crisis: Brave New World or Back to the Future? Replies to a questionnaire sent to central bankers and economists," Post-Print halshs-00881344, HAL.
    4. Issing, Otmar, 2012. "Central banks: Paradise lost," CFS Working Paper Series 2012/06, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Yasin Akçelik & Ahmet Faruk Aysan & Arif Oduncu, 2013. "Central Banking in Making during the Post-Crisis World and the Policy-Mix of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 2(2), pages 5-18.
    6. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    7. Emmanuel Carré & Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran & Dominique Plihon & Marc Pourroy, 2013. "Central Banking after the Crisis: Brave New World or Back to the Future?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. Masciandaro Donato, 2012. "Back to the Future?: Central Banks as Prudential Supervisors in the Aftermath of the Crisis," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 112-130, July.
    9. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    10. Amin Samman, 2015. "Crisis theory and the historical imagination," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(5), pages 966-995, October.
    11. George S. Tavlas, 2016. "New Perspectives on the Great Depression: A Review Essay," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 353-374, December.
    12. Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
    13. Otmar Issing, 2012. "The Mayekawa Lecture: Central Banks-Paradise Lost," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 30, pages 55-74, November.
    14. Otmar Issing, 2012. "Central Banks - Paradise Lost," IMES Discussion Paper Series 12-E-10, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    15. Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, 2000. "Measurement Error and the Relationship between Investment and q," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 1027-1057, October.
    16. Lloyd Ulman, 1992. "Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 177-212, June.
    17. Fritz Breuss, 2016. "The Crisis Management of the ECB," WIFO Working Papers 507, WIFO.
    18. V. Ragupathy & Stefano Zambelli & K. Vela Velupillai, 2013. "A Non-linear Model of the Trade Cycle: Mathematical Reflections on Hugh Hudson's Classic," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 115-125, June.
    19. Hany Shawky & Ronald Forbes & Alan Frankle, 1983. "Liquidity Services and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case for Money Market Mutual Funds," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 6(2), pages 141-152, June.
    20. Ftiti, Zied & Aguir, Abdelkader & Smida, Mounir, 2017. "Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 215-227.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jculte:v:9:y:2016:i:1:p:5-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RJCE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.