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Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive servicing is good for business and affordable homeownership policy”: What prevents loan modifications?

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  • Kurt Eggert

Abstract

After discussing the article by Stegman et al., this comment describes the barriers to preventive servicing for securitized residential loans and assesses the importance of loan modifications, given the recent increases in default and foreclosure rates for subprime loans. Several hurdles slow or reduce such modifications, even those that help borrowers and investors alike. For example, self‐interest may reduce servicers’ willingness to modify loans rapidly. In addition, underlying securitization agreements may impede servicers’ ability and discretion in this area. Further, tax laws that govern a common securitization entity may limit modifications, as may accounting standards. Finally, “tranche warfare,” the sometimes contradictory fiduciary duties servicers have toward investors holding different tranches of securitized pools, may decrease their ability or their willingness to modify loans. This comment concludes that barriers to effective loan modifications should be reduced or eliminated where feasible, but that the securitization of subprime loans creates risks for borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurt Eggert, 2007. "Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive servicing is good for business and affordable homeownership policy”: What prevents loan modifications?," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 279-297, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:houspd:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:279-297
    DOI: 10.1080/10511482.2007.9521601
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2006. "Loan servicer heterogeneity and the termination of subprime mortgages," Working Papers 2006-024, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    2. Yingjin Hila Gan & Christopher Mayer, 2006. "Agency Conflicts, Asset Substitution, and Securitization," NBER Working Papers 12359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. James N. Conklin & Moussa Diop & Thao Le & Walter D’Lima, 2019. "The Importance of Originator-Servicer Affiliation in Loan Renegotiation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 56-89, July.
    2. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2010. "Market-Based Loss Mitigation Practices for Troubled Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis," Working Paper Series 2010-19, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    3. Christopher Foote & Kristopher Gerardi & Lorenz Goette & Paul Willen, 2010. "Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 89-138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. J. Michael Collins & Carolina Reid, 2010. "Who receives a mortgage modification? Race and income differentials in loan workouts," Community Development Working Paper 2010-07, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    5. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2011. "The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 559-578.
    6. Børsum, Øystein, 2010. "Contagious Mortgage Default," Memorandum 10/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Agarwal, Sumit & Zhang, Yunqi, 2018. "Effects of government bailouts on mortgage modification," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 54-70.
    8. Zhang, Yan, 2013. "Does loan renegotiation differ by securitization status? A transition probability study," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 513-527.
    9. Russell, Blair D. & Moulton, Stephanie & Greenbaum, Robert T., 2014. "Take-up of mortgage assistance for distressed homeowners: The role of geographic accessibility," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 57-74.

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