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How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context

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  • Brad L. LeVeck
  • Neil Narang

Abstract

We investigate the role of international reputation in alliance politics by developing a signaling theory linking past alliance violations with the formation of future alliance commitments. In our theory, past violations Are useful signals of future alliance reliability conditional on whether they effectively separate reliable from unreliable alliance partners. It follows that states evaluating potential alliance partners will interpret past violations in their context when deciding to enter a new alliance, attaching less weight to violations in “harder times,” when many states are defaulting on their alliance commitments together, and more weight to violations in “easier times,” when fewer states are defaulting on their alliances. We test our theory and find that states are empirically more likely to form new alliances with states that violated in harder times compared to states that violated in easier times. The results have important implications for how scholars understand and estimate the impact of international reputation.

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  • Brad L. LeVeck & Neil Narang, 2017. "How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(5), pages 797-821, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:797-821
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1237818
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Tomz, 2007. "The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt, from Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries," Introductory Chapters, in: Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Allan Dafoe & Remco Zwetsloot & Matthew Cebul, 2021. "Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(7-8), pages 1378-1404, August.
    2. Weber, Shlomo & Weber, Yuval & Wiesmeth, Hans, 2019. "Hierarchy of Membership and Burden Sharing in a Military Alliance," CEPR Discussion Papers 13965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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