IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ginixx/v26y2000i4p379-410.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel W. Drezner

Abstract

Despite a marked increase in research on economic sanctions, empirical work has been constrained to a set of cases where sanctions are used for political or security issues, i.e., “high politics.” Since most theories of sanctions are generalizable to cases of political economy, i.e., “low politics,” this ad hoc empirical restriction is puzzling. This paper examines how well the existing theories of economic coercion can explain sanctions used to extract concessions on trade or regulatory issues. These theories are tested on a data set of 86 observations of the United States using or threatening section 301 action against a variety of target states. The results indicate that a conflict expectations approach is able to explain these cases as well as cases of high politics sanctions. Approaches stressing domestic politics or the use of sanctions as signals are of little use.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel W. Drezner, 2000. "Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4), pages 379-410, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:4:p:379-410
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434972
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434972
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/03050620108434972?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kimberly Ann Elliott & Thomas O. Bayard, 1994. "Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 78, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Suma Athreye & Lucia Piscitello & Kenneth C. Shadlen, 2020. "Twenty-five years since TRIPS: Patent policy and international business," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 3(4), pages 315-328, December.
    2. Shujiro Urata, 2020. "US–Japan Trade Frictions: The Past, the Present, and Implications for the US–China Trade War," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 15(1), pages 141-159, January.
    3. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "Constraining and supporting effects of the multilateral trading system on U.S. unilateralism," IHEID Working Papers 09-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    4. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1997. "Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 402-424, October.
    5. Bruce A. Blonigen & Robert C. Feenstra, 1997. "Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, pages 55-80, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Nuno Limão & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2018. "Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 15, pages 403-426, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6629 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. William Roberts Clark & Erick Duchesne & William L. Reed, 2006. "Strategic Interaction and Trade Policymaking: Formal Analysis and Simulation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 507-520, April.
    9. John C. Beghin & Heidi Schweizer, 2021. "Agricultural Trade Costs," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 500-530, June.
    10. Byron Gangnes & Craig Parsons, 2007. "Have US–Japan Trade Agreements Made a Difference?," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 548-566.
    11. Guanyi Leu, 2011. "ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) Strategy," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 30(2), pages 31-64.
    12. Richard Sherman & Johan Eliasson, 2006. "Trade Disputes and Non‐state Actors: New Institutional Arrangements and the Privatisation of Commercial Diplomacy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 473-489, April.
    13. Chad P. Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "U.S. Anti-dumping: Much Ado about Zeroing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 10, pages 195-232, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. Eric Reinhardt, 2001. "Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 174-195, April.
    15. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, 2001. "TRADE POLICY IN TRANSITION? political economy of antidumping in Japan," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 22-46.
    16. Alasdair R. Young, 2004. "The Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and World Trade," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 393-414, June.
    17. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Richard Sherman, 2001. "Fairness and the Dynamic Stability of Institutions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(3), pages 297-319, June.
    19. Kishore Gawande, 1997. "A Test of a Theory of Strategically Retaliatory Trade Barriers," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 425-449, October.
    20. Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.
    21. Kenneth Kasa, 1995. "Gaiatsu," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue sep15.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:4:p:379-410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GINI20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.