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Institutional determinants of trade policy

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  • Fiona McGillivray
  • Alastair Smith

Abstract

A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral districts receive the most protection. In the United States, a plurality system with low party discipline, large industries geographically dispersed over many electoral districts receive the most favorable protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Fiona McGillivray & Alastair Smith, 1997. "Institutional determinants of trade policy," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 119-143, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:2:p:119-143
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434904
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1239-1282.
    2. Thao, Chu Minh, 2018. "The Transformation Of Vietnamese Trade Policy," OSF Preprints 7qdnt, Center for Open Science.
    3. Robert Pahre, 2004. "House Rules: Institutional Choice and United States Trade Negotiations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(3), pages 195-213, July.
    4. Talya Bobick & Alastair Smith, 2013. "The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the resolution of WTO disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 423-445, December.

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