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The cost of protection racket in Sicily

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  • Adam Asmundo

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the current cost of protection rackets in Sicily. By means of a database constructed on judicial evidence, it has been possible to come up with an estimate of the average and total costs of the protection-money system, as well as finding out in which sectors of economic activity and in which provinces is most pervasive. The average monthly payment is approximately 600 euros per business, with stronger effects in those areas with a relatively more traditional economic structure. As a whole, in monetary terms, the protection racket in Sicily accounts for over 1.4% of gross regional product. Finally, the paper supports the hypothesis that in most cases, the pervasive presence of the mafia represents a considerable constraint on business growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Asmundo, 2008. "The cost of protection racket in Sicily," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 221-240, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:fglcxx:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:221-240
    DOI: 10.1080/17440570802254338
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    Cited by:

    1. López Cruz, Iván G., 2019. "Policing, schooling and human capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 572-597.
    2. Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana & Keith Blackburn, 2017. "An empirical analysis of organized crime, corruption and economic growth," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 273-298, August.
    3. Dario Musolino & Ilaria Mariotti, 2020. "Mental maps of entrepreneurs and location factors: an empirical investigation on Italy," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 64(3), pages 501-521, June.
    4. Lucia dalla Pellegrina & Giorgio Di Maio & Donato Masciandaro & Margherita Saraceno, 2020. "Organized crime, suspicious transaction reporting and anti-money laundering regulation," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(12), pages 1761-1775, December.
    5. Marco Dugato & Francesco Calderoni & Gian Maria Campedelli, 2020. "Measuring Organised Crime Presence at the Municipal Level," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 237-261, January.
    6. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Lucio Masserini & Monica Pratesi, 2018. "Resisting the extortion racket: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-37, August.
    7. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, March.
    8. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana, 2015. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 210, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    9. Dario Musolino & Alba Distaso & Claudio Marcianò, 2020. "The Role of Social Farming in the Socio-Economic Development of Highly Marginal Regions: An Investigation in Calabria," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(13), pages 1-20, June.
    10. Balletta, Luigi & Lavezzi, Andrea Mario, 2023. "The economics of extortion: Theory and the case of the Sicilian Mafia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1109-1141.
    11. Luigi Balletta & Andrea Mario Lavezzi, 2019. "The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia," Discussion Papers 2019/242, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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