IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/defpea/v18y2007i4p339-352.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ramsey In Dual-Population Lands: Internal Conflict And Utility-Maximizing Consumption

Author

Listed:
  • Amnon Levy
  • Joao Ricardo Faria

Abstract

Ramsey's model is extended to three possible scenarios of conflicts in dual-population lands: partition, federation and civil war. The federally utility-maximizing consumption-growth rate in a strictly political federation might be lower than that under partition for the wealthier and more slowly multiplying group. This group may benefit from joining a federation that facilitates technological transfer and from obeying the federal no-arbitrage rule as long as its own technology is inferior to the hybrid. The utility-maximizing consumption growth rate for a group engaged in a civil war is larger than those under partition and a strictly political federation if its rival's warfare is mainly aimed at inflicting casualties and is likely to be smaller when its rival's warfare is mainly sabotage.

Suggested Citation

  • Amnon Levy & Joao Ricardo Faria, 2007. "Ramsey In Dual-Population Lands: Internal Conflict And Utility-Maximizing Consumption," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 339-352.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:18:y:2007:i:4:p:339-352
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690600951698
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690600951698
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10242690600951698?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ibrahim Elbadawi & Nicholas Sambanis, 2002. "How Much War Will we see?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 307-334, June.
    2. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-573, October.
    3. Marta Reynal-Querol, 2002. "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 29-54, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Camacho, Carmen & Hassan, Waleed, 2023. "The dynamics of revolution: Discrimination, social unrest and the optimal timing of revolution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    2. Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," PSE Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.
    3. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
    4. Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2010. "The Roles of Freedom, Growth, and Religion in the Taste for Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 329-358, May.
    2. J Paul Dunne & Nan Tian, 2016. "Determinants of Civil War and Excess Zeroes," SALDRU Working Papers 191, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
    3. Jean-Paul Azam & Kartika Bhatia, 2017. "Provoking insurgency in a federal state: theory and application to India," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 183-210, March.
    4. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 243-260, October.
    5. Issifou, Ismael, 2017. "Can migration reduce civil conflicts as an antidote to rent-seeking?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 333-353.
    6. Rigterink, Anouk S., 2010. "The wrong suspect. An enquiry into the endogeneity of natural resource measures to civil war," MPRA Paper 45263, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Camille Laville, 2018. "The econometrical causal analysis of internal conflicts: The evolutions of a growing literature [L’analyse économétrique des conflits internes par l’approche causale : les évolutions d’une littérat," Working Papers hal-01940461, HAL.
    8. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-01583559 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Nauro F. Campos & Vitaliy S. Kuzeyev, 2007. "On the Dynamics of Ethnic Fractionalization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(3), pages 620-639, July.
    10. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Poelhekke, Steven, 2010. "The pungent smell of "red herrings": Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 44-55, July.
    11. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Von Berlepsch, Viola, 2017. "Does population diversity matter for economic development in the very long-term? Historic migration, diversity and county wealt," CEPR Discussion Papers 12347, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Héctor Galindo Silva, 2007. "Polarización económica y emergencia de confilctos violentos internos un estudio empírico," Documentos de Economía 4449, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá.
    13. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Viola Berlepsch, 2019. "Does Population Diversity Matter for Economic Development in the Very Long Term? Historic Migration, Diversity and County Wealth in the US," European Journal of Population, Springer;European Association for Population Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 873-911, December.
    14. Carolyn Chisadza & Manoel Bittencourt, 2016. "Globalisation and Conflict: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers 201640, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    15. Rohner, Dominic, 2011. "Reputation, group structure and social tensions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 188-199, November.
    16. Philip Keefer, 2008. "Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 22(1), pages 33-61, January.
    17. Bridgman, Benjamin, 2008. "Why are ethnically divided countries poor?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-18, March.
    18. José G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2005. "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 796-816, June.
    19. Pooja Karnane & Michael A. Quinn, 2019. "Political instability, ethnic fractionalization and economic growth," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 435-461, April.
    20. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens," CEPN Working Papers 2017-14, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    21. Michael Jetter & Bei Li, 2017. "The Political Economy of Opposition Groups: Peace, Terrorism, or Civil Conflict," CESifo Working Paper Series 6747, CESifo.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:18:y:2007:i:4:p:339-352. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.