Better weapons or better troops?
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DOI: 10.1080/10430710108404988
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Jonathan Lipow & Yakir Plessner, 2008. "Tax Efficiency And Quality/Quantity Trade-Offs In Defense Procurement," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 21-26.
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Keywords
Military budget; Officer reputation; Weapon quality;All these keywords.
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