IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/conmgt/v33y2015i1p35-54.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Synthetic cash flow model with singularity functions for unbalanced bidding scenarios

Author

Listed:
  • Yi Su
  • Gunnar Lucko

Abstract

Construction contractors may utilize unbalanced markup bidding strategies, e.g. front-loading, to seek more beneficial cash flows, or even protect their target profits. A difference between ethical and unethical unbalanced bidding is whether the bid has been mathematically or even materially modified: the former may be allowable, but the latter should be rejected, as it fails to cover even the cost of later activities. Unbalanced bidding adds to the complexity of cash flow models and requires a new model that can calculate different scenarios accurately and efficiently. Basic new theory is explored for unbalanced bidding in cash flow models by employing the range-based class of singularity functions. First, a new synthetic balanced cash flow model that can accurately consider the time value of money (TVM) and retainage is derived to serve as the foundation; second, various unbalanced markup functions including two-phase, linear, and non-linear types are defined both cumulatively and non-cumulatively; third, the performance of the extended synthetic cash flow model for unbalanced bidding is investigated mathematically.

Suggested Citation

  • Yi Su & Gunnar Lucko, 2015. "Synthetic cash flow model with singularity functions for unbalanced bidding scenarios," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 35-54, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:conmgt:v:33:y:2015:i:1:p:35-54
    DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2015.1012527
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01446193.2015.1012527
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/01446193.2015.1012527?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Arditi & Ranon Chotibhongs, 2009. "Detection and prevention of unbalanced bids," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(8), pages 721-732.
    2. Symeon Christodoulou, 2008. "A bid-unbalancing method for lowering a contractor's financial risk," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(12), pages 1291-1302.
    3. Qingbin Cui & Makarand Hastak & Daniel Halpin, 2010. "Systems analysis of project cash flow management strategies," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 361-376.
    4. X.-X. Yuan, 2011. "A correlated bidding model for markup size decisions," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(11), pages 1101-1119.
    5. Gunnar Lucko, 2013. "Supporting financial decision-making based on time value of money with singularity functions in cash flow models," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 238-253, March.
    6. Lawrence Friedman, 1956. "A Competitive-Bidding Strategy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(1), pages 104-112, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mahir Msawil & Faris Elghaish & Krisanthi Seneviratne & Stephen McIlwaine, 2021. "Developing a Parametric Cash Flow Forecasting Model for Complex Infrastructure Projects: A Comparative Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-26, October.
    2. Polat Gul & Turkoglu Harun & Damci Atilla & Akin Firat Dogu, 2020. "Detecting unbalanced bids via an improved grading-based model," Organization, Technology and Management in Construction, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 2072-2082, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Polat Gul & Turkoglu Harun & Damci Atilla & Akin Firat Dogu, 2020. "Detecting unbalanced bids via an improved grading-based model," Organization, Technology and Management in Construction, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 2072-2082, January.
    2. João Adelino Ribeiro & Paulo Jorge Pereira & Elísio Brandão, 2013. "Volume Uncertainty in Construction Projects: a Real Options Approach," CEF.UP Working Papers 1309, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Lucko Gunnar, 2016. "Financial Planning and Management Practices of Electrical Contractors," Organization, Technology and Management in Construction, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 1482-1498, December.
    4. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    5. Qiao, Yu & Labi, Samuel & Fricker, Jon D., 2021. "Does highway project bundling policy affect bidding competition? Insights from a mixed ordinal logistic model," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 228-242.
    6. Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo & del Campo-Hitschfeld, Maria Luisa & Mora-Melià, Daniel & Domínguez, David, 2015. "Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 2(C), pages 24-35.
    7. Swider, Derk J. & Weber, Christoph, 2007. "Bidding under price uncertainty in multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auctions for power systems reserve," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 181(3), pages 1297-1308, September.
    8. Svante Mandell & Johan Nyström, 2013. "Too Much Balance in Unbalanced Bidding," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 1(1), pages 23-35, June.
    9. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    10. Yukang He & Tao Jia & Weibo Zheng, 2024. "Simulated annealing for centralised resource-constrained multiproject scheduling to minimise the maximal cash flow gap under different payment patterns," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 338(1), pages 115-149, July.
    11. Skitmore, Martin, 2002. "Identifying non-competitive bids in construction contract auctions," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 443-449, December.
    12. Fanzeres, Bruno & Ahmed, Shabbir & Street, Alexandre, 2019. "Robust strategic bidding in auction-based markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 272(3), pages 1158-1172.
    13. Yuichi Takano & Nobuaki Ishii & Masaaki Muraki, 2017. "Multi-period resource allocation for estimating project costs in competitive bidding," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(2), pages 303-323, June.
    14. Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong & Marra, Michele & Levy, Armando, 2008. "Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1323-1332, November.
    15. Cova, Bernard & Mazet, Florence & Salle, Robert, 1996. "Milieu as a pertinent unit of analysis in project marketing," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 5(6), pages 647-664, December.
    16. Paulo Fagandini & Ingemar Dierickx, 2023. "Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1009-1035, March.
    17. Abhishek Behl & Pankaj Dutta, 2019. "Humanitarian supply chain management: a thematic literature review and future directions of research," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 283(1), pages 1001-1044, December.
    18. Mandell, Svante & Nyström, Johan, 2011. "Why are bids not more unbalanced?," Working papers in Transport Economics 2011:13, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    19. Pickl, Matthias & Wirl, Franz, 2011. "Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2143-2151, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:conmgt:v:33:y:2015:i:1:p:35-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RCME20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.