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An empirical investigation of the Paramount antitrust case

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  • Ricard Gil

Abstract

Production patterns in the US movie industry changed drastically between 1940 and 1960. During these decades, a major event took place: the Paramount antitrust case was resolved by the US Supreme Court in 1948. As a result, the five largest studios (MGM, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers and RKO) were forced to vertically disintegrate and separate production and distribution from exhibition. The Supreme Court also banned these and three other studios (Columbia, Universal and United Artists) from using block booking as contractual practice. In this article, I examine how this antitrust ruling affected the movie industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricard Gil, 2010. "An empirical investigation of the Paramount antitrust case," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(2), pages 171-183.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:42:y:2010:i:2:p:171-183
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840701604404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilbert, Richard & Hastings, Justine, 2001. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6nf907n4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    2. Sendhil Mullainathan & David Scharfstein, 2001. "Do Firm Boundaries Matter?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 195-199, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bezjian, James & Stoyanova, Veselina & McKiernan, Peter & MacKay, R. Bradley, 2020. "Synthesizing scenario planning and industry recipes through an analysis of the Hollywood film industry," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    2. Mitsuru Sunada, 2012. "Competition among movie theaters: an empirical investigation of the Toho–Subaru antitrust case," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 36(3), pages 179-206, August.
    3. Fernanda Gutiérrez-Navratil & Víctor Fernández-Blanco & Luis Orea Sánchez & Juan Prieto Rodríguez, 2017. "Do Movie Majors Really Collude? Indirect Evidence from Release Schedules," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 221(2), pages 9-31, June.
    4. Jordi McKenzie, 2023. "The economics of movies (revisited): A survey of recent literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 480-525, April.
    5. Marissa Beck & Fiona Scott Morton, 2021. "Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 273-302, September.

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