IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apeclt/v21y2014i17p1226-1229.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The elephant in the room: why some states are refusing to expand Medicaid

Author

Listed:
  • Russell S. Sobel

Abstract

After the US Supreme Court overturned the Affordable Care Act's mandate that states expand Medicaid, roughly half the states have declined to expand. Declining states blame the high state budgetary cost. While these states do have significantly higher expansion costs, they are also significantly more likely to have Republican Party control of the legislature and governor office. Statistical inquiry confirms that after controlling for costs, it is indeed political party control, particularly of the lower chamber of the state legislature that is the most important statistical determinant of state Medicaid expansion decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell S. Sobel, 2014. "The elephant in the room: why some states are refusing to expand Medicaid," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(17), pages 1226-1229, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:17:p:1226-1229
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.920469
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2014.920469
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13504851.2014.920469?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Husted, Thomas A & Kenny, Lawrence W, 1997. "The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 54-82, February.
    2. Barrilleaux, Charles J. & Miller, Mark E., 1988. "The Political Economy of State Medicaid Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1089-1107, December.
    3. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kerianne Lawson & Joshua C. Hall, 2023. "Who should be behind the wheel? A study of Oregon's Measure 88," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 43(4), pages 1797-1801.
    2. Peter T. Leeson & Henry A. Thompson, 2023. "Public choice and public health," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 5-41, April.
    3. Sutter, Daniel, 2016. "The Political Economy of Medicaid Expansion: Federalism, Interest Groups, and the ACA," Working Papers 06860, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Francois Facchini, 2018. "What Are the Determinants of Public Spending? An Overview of the Literature," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 46(4), pages 419-439, December.
    3. Jody W. Lipford, 2022. "The Distribution of Transfers and Taxes: Incentives and Implications for the US Deficit and Debt," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
    4. Jody W. Lipford & Bruce Yandle, 2014. "Grazing the State and Local Fiscal Commons," Public Finance Review, , vol. 42(4), pages 466-486, July.
    5. Nyhus, Ole Henning & Strøm, Bjarne, 2023. "School spending and extension of the youth voting franchise: Quasi-experimental evidence from Norway," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    6. Facchini, Francois, 2014. "The determinants of public spending: a survey in a methodological perspective," MPRA Paper 53006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Thomas A. Husted & Lawrence W. Kenny, 2007. "Explanations for States Adopting Limits on Educational Spending," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(5), pages 586-605, September.
    8. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2008. "Too big or too small? A synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 551-559, November.
    9. Dalle Nogare, Chiara & Kauder, Björn, 2017. "Term limits for mayors and intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Italian cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-11.
    10. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7p9a2ge1op95oao5se2oc4ann7 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Dörrenberg Philipp & Heinemann Friedrich & Khayal Nuri, 2015. "Reformoptionen für den deutschen Finanzföderalismus," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 26-43, March.
    12. León, Gianmarco, 2017. "Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 56-71.
    13. Russo, Massimo, 1998. "Policy coordination in the European Union (from the EMS to EMU)," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34386, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    14. Michał Mackiewicz, 2006. "Przyczyny deficytu finansów publicznych w świetle nowej ekonomii politycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 1-22.
    15. Emanuele Bracco & Alberto Brugnoli, 2012. "Runoff vs. plurality," Working Papers 23767067, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    16. Hirota, Haruaki & Yunoue, Hideo, 2017. "Evaluation of the fiscal effect on municipal mergers: Quasi-experimental evidence from Japanese municipal data," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 132-149.
    17. Biavaschi, Costanza & Facchini, Giovanni, 2020. "Immigrant Franchise and Immigration Policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era," IZA Discussion Papers 13195, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Bouton, Laurent & Gassner, Marjorie & Verardi, Vincenzo, 2008. "Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 317-328, June.
    19. Ant—nio Afonso & Ludger Schuknecht & Vito Tanzi, 2023. "The size of government," Chapters, in: António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles & Ana Venâncio (ed.), Handbook on Public Sector Efficiency, chapter 1, pages 6-31, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Melle Marco C., 2014. "Eine europäische Bemessungsgrundlage für die Körperschaftsteuer? Konzeption und ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Conceptual design and constitutional economics analysis of a European tax base for corpora," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 133-156, January.
    21. Rausser, Gordon C. & de Gorter, Harry, 1988. "Endogenizing Policy In Models Of Agricultural Markets," 1988 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Knoxville, Tennessee 270460, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:17:p:1226-1229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.