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The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the international public good model

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  • Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi
  • Kenichi Suzuki

Abstract

The international public good model is an extension of the public good model, allowing for different productivities of producing the public good across countries. By extending the proofs of Bergstrom et al. (1986, 1992), which are the seminal studies in the public good literature, this article develops an international public good model with proofs of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi & Kenichi Suzuki, 2011. "The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the international public good model," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(18), pages 1751-1754, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:18:p:1751-1754
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2011.562155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, April.
    2. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1996. "International public goods and contribution productivity differentials," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 139-154, July.
    3. Boadway, Robin & Hayashi, Masayoshi, 1999. "Country size and the voluntary provision of international public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 619-638, November.
    4. Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September.
    5. Lei, Vivian & Tucker, Steven & Vesely, Filip, 2007. "Foreign aid and weakest-link international public goods: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 599-623, April.
    6. Bergstrom, Ted C. & Blume, Larry & Varian, Hal, 1992. "Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods : An improved proof," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 391-392, December.
    7. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    8. Toshihiro Ihori, 1999. "An Economic Analysis of Public Transfers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 44-60, March.
    9. Jin Kim & Shim, Seungjin, 2006. "Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 311-316, September.
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