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Aggregative Public Good Games

Author

Listed:
  • Roger Hartley

    (Keele University Department of Economics)

  • Richard Cornes

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham,)

Abstract

We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyse games involving many heterogeneous players.We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public economic model and show how it can analyse extensions of the basic model.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2003. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2003/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2003/05
    as

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    File URL: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/wpapers/kerp0305.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. (*), Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Buchholz & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 1997. "Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(1), pages 29-43.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Noncooperative games; public goods;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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