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Measuring market power of the US cigarette industry

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  • Deergha Raj Adhikari

Abstract

The US cigarette industry is attributed to have been involved in cartel practices from time to time. Such practice undermines the actual purpose of deregulation. So far, there have been sparse studies on measuring their market power. The studies done so far have mostly found that the US cigarette industry has not been perfectly competitive. Most of the studies were done a long time ago and the industry has undergone substantial structural changes since then (in the late 1980s and 1990s). Therefore, this study attempts to measure their market power in recent years. Evidence that the US cigarette industry is competitive is found.

Suggested Citation

  • Deergha Raj Adhikari, 2004. "Measuring market power of the US cigarette industry," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(15), pages 957-959.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:11:y:2004:i:15:p:957-959
    DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000282222
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Minton & Casey B. Mulligan, 2024. "Difference-in-Differences in the Marketplace," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-008, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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