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Eigenkapitalpuffer im Abschwung wirksam?
[Are Equity Buffers Effective During the Eonomic Downturn?]

Author

Listed:
  • Franziska Bremus

    (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)

  • Lukas Menkhoff

    (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Der antizyklische Kapitalpuffer und der Kapitalerhaltungspuffer wurden für die Verstetigung der Kreditvergabe sowie eine höhere Resilienz des Finanzsystems geschaffen. Fraglich bleibt, wie gut diese Puffer speziell im Abschwung in der Praxis von den Finanzinstituten genutzt werden. Dem Signalisierungsproblem zufolge könnte eine sinkende Eigenkapitalquote als positives (Fähigkeit zu Neugeschäften) aber auch negatives Zeichen (geringere Stabilität) gedeutet werden. Hinzu kommt das Unsicherheitsproblem, bei dem Kreditinstitute freigesetztes Eigenkapital in unsicheren Zeiten nicht für zusätzliches Kreditgeschäft nutzen.

Suggested Citation

  • Franziska Bremus & Lukas Menkhoff, 2021. "Eigenkapitalpuffer im Abschwung wirksam? [Are Equity Buffers Effective During the Eonomic Downturn?]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(3), pages 207-212, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:101:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10273-021-2875-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-021-2875-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lukas Menkhoff, 2022. "Der antizyklische Kapitalpuffer: Reformoptionen [Reform Options for the Countercyclical Capital Buffer]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 102(1), pages 59-63, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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