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Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis

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  • Mabbett, Deborah
  • Schelkle, Waltraud

Abstract

The financial crisis has called our understanding of central bank independence (CBI) into question. Central banks were praised for bold interventions but simultaneously criticized for overreaching their mandates. Central bankers themselves have complained that they are ‘the only game in town’. We develop the second generation theory of CBI to understand how independence can turn into loneliness when a financial crisis calls for cooperation between fiscal authorities and the central bank. Central banks are protected from interference when there are multiple political veto-players, but the latter can also block cooperation. Furthermore, central banks in multi-veto-player systems operate under legal constraints on their financial stabilization actions. They can circumvent these constraints, but this invites criticism and retribution. More surprisingly, central banks have strategically invoked their constraints to gain cooperation from political authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Mabbett, Deborah & Schelkle, Waltraud, 2019. "Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90879, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:90879
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90879/
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank independence; delegation; financial crisis; monetary policy; veto-players; strategic agents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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