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Cartel formation and managerial incentives

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  • Norma Olaizola

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Suggested Citation

  • Norma Olaizola, 2007. "Cartel formation and managerial incentives," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 219-236, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:specre:v:9:y:2007:i:3:p:219-236
    DOI: 10.1007/s10108-006-9023-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sylvie Thoron, 1998. "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 63-76, February.
    2. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    3. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1976. "Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(2), pages 233-240, March.
    5. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rasch, Alexander & Wambach, Achim, 2009. "Internal decision-making rules and collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 703-715, November.
    2. Johannes Paha, 2013. "The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201328, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Johannes Paha, 2010. "Simulation and Prosecution of a Cartel with Endogenous Cartel Formation," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201007, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartels; Strategic delegation; Stability; Absorbing sets solution; L22; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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