IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v54y2020i2d10.1007_s00355-020-01241-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A modified version of Arrow’s IIA condition

Author

Listed:
  • E. Maskin

    (Harvard University
    Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

I propose a modified version of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition (IIA). The new version preserves the most attractive feature of traditional IIA, viz., that it rules out vote-splitting in elections (in which two or more popular candidates split the vote, allowing a relatively unpopular candidate to win). Moreover, it permits election outcomes to reflect voters' preference intensities, unlike the traditional condition.

Suggested Citation

  • E. Maskin, 2020. "A modified version of Arrow’s IIA condition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 203-209, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01241-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    2. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. António Osório, 2020. "Performance Evaluation: Subjectivity, Bias and Judgment Style in Sport," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 655-678, August.
    2. António Osório, 2017. "Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 253(1), pages 501-518, June.
    3. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
    4. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2018. "Arrow’s (im)possibility theorem," Post-Print hal-01941037, HAL.
    5. Harless, Patrick, 2015. "Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 81-86.
    6. Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam, 2021. "Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules," Papers 2111.01983, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    8. Ning Yu, 2015. "A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 533-548, March.
    9. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    10. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    11. L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2019. "Journal ranking should depend on the level of aggregation," Papers 1904.06300, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2019.
    12. Qiaoming Han & Donglei Du & Dachuan Xu & Yicheng Xu, 2018. "Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 859-873, April.
    13. Donaldson, Jason & Piacentino, Giorgia & Malenko, Nadya, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Thayer Morrill & Peter Troyan, 2022. "Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process," Papers 2205.11684, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    15. Daniel Benjamin & Ori Heffetz & Miles Kimball & Derek Lougee, 2017. "The relationship between the normalized gradient addition mechanism and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 233-263, July.
    16. Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada, 2024. "Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(3), pages 677-715, November.
    17. Freixas, Josep & Parker, Cameron, 2015. "Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 144-151.
    18. Stensholt, Eivind, 2019. "MMP-elections and the assembly size," Discussion Papers 2019/15, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    19. Dotti, Valerio, 2014. "Generalized Comparative Statics for Political Economy Models," MPRA Paper 60711, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01241-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.