Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0
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- Ceyhun Coban & Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence," Working Papers 201005, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley, 2020. "A note on Murakami’s theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 243-253, August.
- Susumu Cato, 2016. "Weak independence and the Pareto principle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 295-314, August.
- Cato, Susumu, 2015. "Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 59-61.
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