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Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders

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  • Shin Sato

Abstract

This article incorporates agents’ reluctance to make a large lie into an analysis. A social choice rule is D(k)-proof if the rule is nonmanipulable by false preferences within k distance from the sincere one, where k is a positive integer. If D(k)-proofness is not logically equivalent to strategy-proofness, then agents’ reluctance to make a large lie embodied in D(k)-proofness is effective to construct a nonmanipulable rule. This article considers weak orders as agents’ preferences. I prove that on the universal domain, D(k)-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness if and only if k ≥ m − 1, where m is the number of alternatives. Moreover, I find a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of D(1)-proofness and strategy-proofness. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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  • Shin Sato, 2013. "Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 479-494, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:479-494
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0616-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    2. Gabriel Carroll, 2012. "When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 661-686, March.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomson, William, 2024. "On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 91-104.
    2. Karmokar, Madhuparna & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," MPRA Paper 103494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kikuchi, Kazuya, 2016. "Comparing preference orders: Asymptotic independence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 1-5.
    4. Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik, 2016. "Local incentive compatibility with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 149-165.
    5. Kikuchi, Kazuya & 菊地, 和也, 2014. "Comparing Preference Orders:Asymptotic Independence," Discussion Papers 2014-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

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