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Endogenous Voting Agendas

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  • John Duggan

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  • John Duggan, 2006. "Endogenous Voting Agendas," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 495-530, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:495-530
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0143-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    2. Duggan, John & Fey, Mark, 2005. "Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 490-522, May.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2023. "Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation And Obstruction," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(2), pages 757-781, May.
    2. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    3. Michael Peress, 2010. "The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 265-294, February.
    4. Keith Dougherty & Brian Pitts & Justin Moeller & Robi Ragan, 2014. "An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 359-382, March.
    5. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2009. "Gradualism in dynamic agenda formation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 42012, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Elizabeth Penn, 2008. "A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 201-213, July.
    7. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2022. "Deciding On What To Decide," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 37-61, February.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2015. "Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking," Working Papers 782, Barcelona School of Economics.
    9. Yves Breitmoser, 2011. "Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 149-169, June.
    10. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2017. "Deciding on what to Decide," Working Papers 973, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2012. "Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 655-678, June.

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