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Economic Value Added: Entscheidungs- versus Anreiznützlichkeit
[Economic Value Added: Decision versus Incentive Usefulness]

Author

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  • Ralf Diedrich

    (Universität Leipzig)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Der Economic Value Added wurde bislang vornehmlich im Hinblick auf Unter- oder Überinvestitionsprobleme untersucht, die der Einsatz als Leistungsmaß zur Folge haben kann. Es ging um die Anreiznützlichkeit der Kennzahl. In der Praxis spielt der Economic Value Added aber nicht nur als Leistungsmaß, sondern auch als Informationsinstrument eine Rolle. Für die Ausgestaltung der Kennzahl ist daher nicht nur ihre Anreiznützlichkeit, sondern auch die Entscheidungsnützlichkeit bedeutsam. Beide Aspekte werden im Rahmen eines Modells mit einem mehrperiodigen Betrachtungszeitraum untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass die Entscheidungs- und die Anreiznützlichkeit des Economic Value Added im Wege einer Anpassung des Kapitalkostensatzes an die realisierte Marktrisikoprämie verbessert werden können.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralf Diedrich, 2017. "Economic Value Added: Entscheidungs- versus Anreiznützlichkeit [Economic Value Added: Decision versus Incentive Usefulness]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 381-403, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:69:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s41471-017-0034-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s41471-017-0034-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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