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Die Vorteilhaftigkeit handelsgerichteter Konditionen eines Herstellers - Ein spieltheoretischer Untersuchungsansatz

Author

Listed:
  • Marcus Kunter

    (RWTH Aachen)

  • Daniel Guhl

    (RWTH Aachen)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag soll freilegen, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen der Einsatz praxistypischer Vergütungsformen der handelsgerichteten Konditionengewährung eines Herstellers vorteilhaft beziehungsweise profitabel ist. Eine Bewertung der Vorteilhaftigkeit erfolgt sowohl aus Sicht der Hersteller-Handels-Koalition als auch aus Herstellersicht jeweils anhand der erzielbaren Gewinne. Werden beide Vergütungsformen eingesetzt, so existiert für jede beliebige Verteilung der Absatzkanalmarge (nach Listenpreismodifikation) eine effiziente, den Absatzkanal koordinierende Konditionenpolitik. Kommt ausschließlich eine der beiden Vergütungsformen zum Einsatz, ist aus Sicht der Hersteller-Handels-Koalition die prozentuale Marktbearbeitungsvergütung generell der Listenpreismodifikation vorzuziehen.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Kunter & Daniel Guhl, 2010. "Die Vorteilhaftigkeit handelsgerichteter Konditionen eines Herstellers - Ein spieltheoretischer Untersuchungsansatz," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 62(7), pages 744-769, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:62:y:2010:i:7:d:10.1007_bf03373679
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03373679
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    L42; M31;

    JEL classification:

    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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