Alternative Verfahren zur Bestimmung innerbetrieblicher Verrechnungspreise
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03371504
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Cited by:
- Christian Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2006. "Verfügungsrechte und spezifische Investitionen: Steuerung über Budgets oder Verrechnungspreise?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 426-454, June.
- Thomas Pfeiffer & Joachim Wagner, 2007. "Die Rekonstruktion interner Märkte, das Dilemma der pretialen Lenkung und spezifi sche Investitionsprobleme," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(8), pages 958-981, December.
- Robert Ullmann & Mark Trede, 2015. "Interquartilsbandbreiten bei der Ermittlung von Verrechnungspreisen: Average-Methode und Pooling-Methode," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 329-366, September.
- Robert F. Göx, 2011. "Innerbetriebliche Verrechnungspreise zur Koordination von Handels- und Investitionsanreizen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 34-44, January.
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