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Is bigger necessarily better for environmental research?

Author

Listed:
  • René Wal

    (School of Biological Sciences
    Hill of Brathens)

  • Anke Fischer

    (The Macaulay Institute)

  • Mick Marquiss

    (University of Aberdeen
    Hill of Brathens)

  • Steve Redpath

    (School of Biological Sciences
    Hill of Brathens)

  • Sarah Wanless

    (Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, Bush Estate
    Hill of Brathens)

Abstract

In restructuring environmental research organisations, smaller sites generally disappear and larger sites are created. These decisions are based on the economic principle, ‘economies of scale’, whereby the average cost of each unit produced falls as output increases. We show that this principle does not apply to the scientific performance of environmental research institutes, as productivity per scientist decreased with increasing size of a research site. The results are best explained by the principle ‘diseconomies of scale’, whereby powerful social factors limit the productivity of larger groupings. These findings should be considered when restructuring environmental science organisations to maximise their quality.

Suggested Citation

  • René Wal & Anke Fischer & Mick Marquiss & Steve Redpath & Sarah Wanless, 2009. "Is bigger necessarily better for environmental research?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 78(2), pages 317-322, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:scient:v:78:y:2009:i:2:d:10.1007_s11192-007-2017-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11192-007-2017-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Erik Canton, 2005. "Power of Incentives in Public Organizations When Employees Are Intrinsically Motivated," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(4), pages 664-680, December.
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    6. Jim Giles, 2006. "Plans to pare down climate centre anger UK ecologists," Nature, Nature, vol. 439(7078), pages 770-771, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Slobodan Perović & Sandro Radovanović & Vlasta Sikimić & Andrea Berber, 2016. "Optimal research team composition: data envelopment analysis of Fermilab experiments," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 108(1), pages 83-111, July.
    2. Marcel Clermont & Alexander Dirksen & Harald Dyckhoff, 2015. "Returns to scale of Business Administration research in Germany," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 103(2), pages 583-614, May.

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