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Are real options more valuable in the presence of agency conflicts?

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  • Barbara Harreiter
  • Thomas Pfeiffer
  • Georg Schneider

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Suggested Citation

  • Barbara Harreiter & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2007. "Are real options more valuable in the presence of agency conflicts?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 185-207, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:rvmgts:v:1:y:2007:i:3:p:185-207
    DOI: 10.1007/s11846-007-0011-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    2. Rick Antle & Peter Bogetoft & Andrew W. Stark, 2007. "Incentive Problems and Investment Timing Options," Springer Books, in: Rick Antle & Frøystein Gjesdal & Pierre Jinghong Liang (ed.), Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski, chapter 0, pages 145-168, Springer.
    3. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover, 2001. "Option Value to Waiting Created by a Control Problem," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 405-415, December.
    4. Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, 1974. "Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 4, pages 76-84, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein, 1999. "Performance Measurement in Multi-Period Agencies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 158-158, March.
    6. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    7. Claude Henry, 1974. "Investment decisions under uncertainty: The "irreversibility effect"," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/327343, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Henry, Claude, 1974. "Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility Effect."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1006-1012, December.
    9. Gunther Friedl, 2002. "Sequential Investment And Time To Build," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 54(1), pages 56-79, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real option; Agency conflict; Delegation; D86;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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