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Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

Author

Listed:
  • Trivikram Dokka

    (Queen’s University Belfast)

  • Hervé Moulin

    (University of Glasgow)

  • Indrajit Ray

    (Cardiff University)

  • Sonali SenGupta

    (Queen’s University Belfast)

Abstract

As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

Suggested Citation

  • Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023. "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 419-438, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-022-00299-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quadratic game; Coarse correlated equilibrium; Abatement level; Efficiency gain;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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