Efficient trading with restriction
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0077-8
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2014. "Efficient trading on a network with incomplete information," Working Papers 1405, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
- Eric S. Chou & Meng-Yu Liang & Cheng-Tai Wu, 2022. "Reorganizing a partnership efficiently," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 233-246, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; Efficient trading; C72; D82;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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