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Efficient trading with restriction

Author

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  • Hu Lu
  • Yuntong Wang

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2009. "Efficient trading with restriction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 319-334, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:4:p:319-334
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0077-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. Lu, Hu & Robert, Jacques, 2001. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 50-80, March.
    4. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2014. "Efficient trading on a network with incomplete information," Working Papers 1405, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    2. Eric S. Chou & Meng-Yu Liang & Cheng-Tai Wu, 2022. "Reorganizing a partnership efficiently," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 233-246, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Efficient trading; C72; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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