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A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires

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  • Stefano Vannucci

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2008. "A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(1), pages 33-44, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:1:p:33-44
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph M. Abdou, 2009. "The Structure of Unstable Power Systems," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00389181, HAL.
    2. Joseph Abdou, 2012. "The structure of unstable power mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 389-415, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalitional game forms; Core stability; Government forms; C71; D70; D71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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