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A multiple network approach to corporate governance

Author

Listed:
  • Fausto Bonacina
  • Marco D’Errico
  • Enrico Moretto
  • Silvana Stefani
  • Anna Torriero
  • Giovanni Zambruno

Abstract

In this work, we consider corporate governance (CG) ties among companies from a multiple network perspective. Such a structure naturally arises from the close interrelation between the Shareholding network and the Board of Directors network. In order to capture the simultaneous effects of both networks on CG, we propose to model the CG multiple network structure via tensor analysis. In particular, we consider the TOPHITS model, based on the PARAFAC tensor decomposition, to show that tensor techniques can be successfully applied in this context. By providing some empirical results from the Italian financial market in the univariate case, we then show that a tensor–based multiple network approach can reveal important information. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Fausto Bonacina & Marco D’Errico & Enrico Moretto & Silvana Stefani & Anna Torriero & Giovanni Zambruno, 2015. "A multiple network approach to corporate governance," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 1585-1595, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:49:y:2015:i:4:p:1585-1595
    DOI: 10.1007/s11135-014-0075-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
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    4. M. D'Errico & R. Grassi & S. Stefani & A. Torriero, 2009. "Shareholding Networks and Centrality: An Application to the Italian Financial Market," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Ahmad K. Naimzada & Silvana Stefani & Anna Torriero (ed.), Networks, Topology and Dynamics, pages 215-228, Springer.
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    9. Santella, Paolo & Drago, Carlo & Polo, Andrea & Gagliardi, Enrico, 2009. "A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom," MPRA Paper 16397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    2. An Zeng & Stefano Battiston, 2016. "The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-15, October.

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