Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective
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DOI: 10.1007/s00291-022-00696-7
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Keywords
Nash equilibrium; Wardrop flow; Price of anarchy; Generalized mean; Parallel link networks;All these keywords.
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