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Pooling of critical, low-utilization resources with unavailability

Author

Listed:
  • Loe Schlicher

    (Eindhoven University of Technology)

  • Marco Slikker

    (Eindhoven University of Technology)

  • Geert-Jan Houtum

    (Eindhoven University of Technology)

Abstract

We consider an environment in which several independent service providers can collaborate by pooling their critical, low-utilization resources that are subject to unavailability. We examine the allocation of the joint profit for such a pooled situation by studying an associated cooperative game. For this game, we will prove non-emptiness of the core, present a population monotonic allocation scheme and show convexity under some conditions. Moreover, four allocation rules will be introduced and we will investigate whether they satisfy monotonicity to availability, monotonicity to profit, situation symmetry and game symmetry. Finally, we will also investigate whether the payoff vectors resulting from those allocation rules are members of the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Loe Schlicher & Marco Slikker & Geert-Jan Houtum, 2018. "Pooling of critical, low-utilization resources with unavailability," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 40(1), pages 233-263, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:orspec:v:40:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00291-017-0499-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s00291-017-0499-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Ruud Hendrickx, 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 9(2), pages 139-199, December.
    2. Heuvel, Wilco van den & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2007. "Economic lot-sizing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(2), pages 1117-1130, January.
    3. Muto, S. & Nakayama, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1988. "On big boss games," Other publications TiSEM 488a314a-179c-4628-91e6-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    5. Behzad Hezarkhani & Marco Slikker & Tom Woensel, 2016. "A competitive solution for cooperative truckload delivery," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(1), pages 51-80, January.
    6. Frank Karsten & Marco Slikker & Geert-Jan van Houtum, 2015. "Resource Pooling and Cost Allocation Among Independent Service Providers," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 476-488, April.
    7. Karsten, Frank & Basten, Rob J.I., 2014. "Pooling of spare parts between multiple users: How to share the benefits?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 233(1), pages 94-104.
    8. Ulac{s} Özen & Jan Fransoo & Henk Norde & Marco Slikker, 2008. "Cooperation Between Multiple Newsvendors with Warehouses," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 10(2), pages 311-324, February.
    9. Jun Li & Xiaoqiang Cai & Yinlian Zeng, 2016. "Cost allocation for less-than-truckload collaboration among perishable product retailers," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(1), pages 81-117, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Westerink-Duijzer, L.E. & Schlicher, L.P.J. & Musegaas, M., 2019. "Fair allocations for cooperation problems in vaccination," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI2019-06, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
    2. Schlicher, Loe & Lurkin, Virginie, 2022. "Stable allocations for choice-based collaborative price setting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(3), pages 1242-1254.

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