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Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing

Author

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  • György Dósa

    (University of Pannonia)

  • Leah Epstein

    (University of Haifa)

Abstract

The bin packing problem deals with packing items of sizes no larger than 1 into unit capacity bins. Here, we analyze a class of bin packing games where the cost of an item is 1 over the total number of items packed into its bin, which is a bin packing congestion game. We study strong equilibria and find the tight values of the SPoA and SPoS, that is, asymptotic approximation ratios of the worst and best strong equilibria. We show that these values are approximately 1.69103 and 1.611824, respectively. In particular, we observe that the two values are not equal, showing a difference from other known kinds of cost sharing approaches.

Suggested Citation

  • György Dósa & Leah Epstein, 2019. "Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 473-485, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jsched:v:22:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10951-018-0587-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10951-018-0587-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 51-68, September.
    2. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
    3. Andelman, Nir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Strong price of anarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 289-317, March.
    4. Ruixin Ma & György Dósa & Xin Han & Hing-Fung Ting & Deshi Ye & Yong Zhang, 2013. "A note on a selfish bin packing problem," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1457-1462, August.
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