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Game Analysis of Investment in a Group with Stickiness

Author

Listed:
  • Cheng Wang

    (Zhejiang University of Technology)

  • Lili Deng

    (Zhejiang University of Technology)

Abstract

This paper studies the investment in a group with stickiness. A group investment game is constructed. By analyzing the best response of each player, the equilibria are presented. Furthermore, the convergence region of each equilibrium is outlined, and the sensitivity analysis of the region to parameters is explored. The game with two players is given to illustrate the convergence region of each equilibrium. The explanation and illustration of the results are summarized. The findings indicate that a successful investment usually occurs in a group with “tolerance”, “open-sharing”, “efficiency”, “sensitivity”, and with large members.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheng Wang & Lili Deng, 2012. "Game Analysis of Investment in a Group with Stickiness," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 1047-1059, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:155:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10957-012-0108-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-012-0108-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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