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Two Game Models for Cooperation with Implicit Noncooperation

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Listed:
  • M. Wei

    (Ohio State University)

  • J. B. Cruz

    (Ohio State University)

Abstract

We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Wei & J. B. Cruz, 2006. "Two Game Models for Cooperation with Implicit Noncooperation," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 505-527, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:130:y:2006:i:3:d:10.1007_s10957-006-9116-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-006-9116-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. B. Cruz & M. A. Simaan, 2000. "Ordinal Games and Generalized Nash and Stackelberg Solutions," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 107(2), pages 205-222, November.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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