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Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Y. Liu

    (The Ohio State University)

  • M. A. Simaan

    (University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Y. Liu & M. A. Simaan, 2004. "Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 120(1), pages 29-51, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:120:y:2004:i:1:d:10.1023_b:jota.0000012731.59061.be
    DOI: 10.1023/B:JOTA.0000012731.59061.be
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. W. Salant, Stephen & Shaffer, Greg, 1998. "Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 195-208, March.
    2. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
    3. Gérard Gaudet & Stephen W. Salant, 1991. "Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 399-404.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Asker, S.S., 2007. "On dynamical multi-team Cournot game in exploitation of a renewable resource," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 264-268.
    2. Andre Rossi de Oliveira & João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2018. "Transnational Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(3), pages 496-528, March.
    3. Elettreby, M.F., 2009. "Two-prey one-predator model," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2018-2027.
    4. Kennedy, Deanna M. & Sommer, S. Amy & Nguyen, Phuong Anh, 2017. "Optimizing multi-team system behaviors: Insights from modeling team communication," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(1), pages 264-278.
    5. Ahmed, E. & Elettreby, M.F. & Hegazi, A.S., 2006. "On Puu’s incomplete information formulation for the standard and multi-team Bertrand game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1180-1184.

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